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If... Contract... is to continue with us .... then we are faced with a
body of doctrine about day to day transactions which originated in
Elizabeth's time, which was built out heavily in a 19th Century that had
only begun to foreshadow modern conditions, and which has never at
any stage been critically restudied as a whole in terms of wherein it
serves well, wherein it is out ofjoint.1
It has sometimes been proposed that the doctrine of consideration be
"abolished."..... What needs abolition is not the doctrine of
consideration but a conception of legal method which assumes that the
doctrine can be understood and applied without reference to the ends it
2serves.
I. INTRODUCTION
In domestic sales contracts, a seller's promise is legally enforceable if it
creates an express warranty.3 Although the criteria for determining whether a
* B.A., M.A., Carleton (Canada); M.Phil., Ph.D., Yale; J.D., Virginia.
1. K.N. Llewellyn, On the Complexity of Consideration: A Foreword, 41 COLUM. L. REV.
777, 782 (1941).
2. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 824 (1941).
3. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1977) (amended 2003). Regarding manufacturers of goods that do not
sell directly to buyers, enforceability may also depend on whether a state's privity requirements bar
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promise creates an express warranty include a bargain test, the application of
the test by most courts still owes much to the tort principles on which warranty
law was originally based. 4 Thus, whether a promise becomes part of the "basis
of the bargain" usually depends on whether the promisee relied on it. 5 The
logic, of course, is that a promisee could not truly have bargained for a promise
that it did not rely upon. 6 The application of the bargain test has therefore
significantly limited the enforceability of promises made in sales transactions.
7
Some courts, for instance, have stated that a seller is not liable for promises
made in advertisements the buyer did not see, read, or hear.8 Others have stated
that a seller is not liable for promises the buyer had reason to doubt based on the
buyer's experience with the good.9 This Essay argues that, as a general matter,
holding manufacturers and sellers-especially the manufacturers and retailers of
mass produced consumer goods-to strict legal obligations for their promises
would better serve both economic efficiency and social ethics.
enforcement of the promise. Compare Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractor, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 208,
215 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (citing Barlow v. DeVilbiss Co., 214 F. Supp. 540, 543 (E.D. Wis. 1963);
Paulson v. Olson Implement Co., 319 N.W.2d 855, 859 (Wis. 1982); City of LaCrosse v. Schubert,
Schroeder & Assocs., Inc., 240 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Wis. 1976)) (stating that Wisconsin law requires
privity of contract to find liability on breach of express warranty), with Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612, 615-16 (Ohio 1958) (applying Ohio law and removing the privity
requirement for enforcement of an express warranty). As a general matter, most states have
dropped the privity bar to express warranty claims. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-7, at 407408 (5th ed. 2000). All of the arguments in this essay
pertaining to sellers are also meant to apply to manufacturers that sell through intermediaries.
4. See James J. White, Freeing the Tortious Soul of Express Warranty Law, 72 TUL. L. REV.
2089, 2090-97 (1998).
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. Indeed, the doctrine of consideration as it has been applied under the bargain theory of
contracts has served to narrow the scope of enforceable promises much more generally. See Kevin
M. Teeven, The Advent of Recovery on Market Transactions in the Absence of a Bargain, 39 AM.
BUS. L.J. 289, 375-76 (2002).
8. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 567 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[A] plaintiff
effectuates the 'basis of the bargain' requirement of section 2-313 by proving that she read, heard,
saw or knew of the advertisement containing the affirmation of fact or promise."), aff'd in part,
rev'd in panl on other grounds, 505 U.S. 504, 525-27 (1992); Dilenno v. Libbey Glass Div.,
Owens-Ill., Inc., 668 F. Supp. 373, 376 (D. Del. 1987) ("There is no evidence in the record to
suggest that [the plaintiff] ever saw the [defendant's] catalog.").
9. See, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1101 n.4
(11 th Cir. 1983) (noting that the court should consider the defendant's expanded knowledge from
many purchases of copying machines in deciding whether the seller's representations formed the
basis of the bargain); Royal Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 44 (7th Cir. 1980)
("An affirmation of fact which the buyer from his experience knows to be untrue cannot form part
of the basis of the bargain." (citing City Mach. & Mfg. Co. v. A. & A. Mach. Corp., 4 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (CBC) 461,465 (E.D.N.Y. 1967))).
[VOL. 60:203
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 1 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss1/6
VALUE OF A PROMISE
Part II outlines the origins and consequences of the basis of the bargain
requirement for the creation of an express warranty in modern sales law. Part III
elaborates on the lemons problem and presents the main theoretical argument of
the Essay. Part IV examines the history of the reliance requirement in the basis
of the bargain test. Part V elaborates on three basic questions that arise in the
application of the bargain test: (1) whether a seller should bear any legal
obligations for promises it made in advertisements that the buyer did not see,
read, or hear prior to contracting; (2) whether a seller should bear any legal
obligations for promises that the buyer had reasons to doubt based on the
buyer's experience with the good; and (3) whether a seller should bear any legal
obligations for a promise that the buyer knew with epistemic certainty to be
false at the time of contracting. Finally, Part V concludes that unless (1) sellers
specifically disclaim affirmations of fact or promises made about their goods at
the time of contracting, or (2) sellers state affirmations of fact or promises the
buyer knows to be false, courts should hold sellers to strict legal obligations for
such affirmations or promises, regardless of whether their buyers saw, read, or
heard the promises prior to contracting or whether their buyers had or should
have had reason to doubt their promises based on prior experience with the
seller's good.
II. PROMISES AND BARGAINS
Promises play an essential role in the social, economic, and moral life of
every culture. People plan their weddings, careers, childbearing, and myriad
other important activities and events in part on the promises that have been
made to them and their expectations about whether those promises will be kept.
Most cultures therefore attach great moral importance to the keeping of
promises, and anyone who breaches one may be subjected to criticism,
ostracism, or other social expressions of moral disapprobation.
The central role that promises play in our lives and the important moral
implications of the decisions we make about whether to make, keep, or breach
promises raise an inevitable question-when should promises be legally
enforceable? Under the bargain theory of contracts that has dominated
American jurisprudence for the last century, a promise is legally enforceable
only when it is made in return for some kind of consideration. Consideration is
10. See generally P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 41-60
(1979) (offering a historical overview of the philosophical writings on promises since Hobbes).
11. See generally ROY KREITNER, CALCULATING PROMISES: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN
AMERICAN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 15-42 (2007) (providing a recent historical overview of
consideration). As Kreitner notes, one of the effects of the developments in the consideration
doctrine during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was to make promises the central
2008]
3
Smythe: The Scope of a Bargain and the Value of a Promise
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
any promise, performance, or forbearance offered in exchange for the
promise-it is essentially evidence of a bargain. 12 Of course, a nominal
promise, performance, or forbearance-the kind that parties might make or
undertake merely to satisfy the formal consideration requirement-would not
provide evidence of a true bargain, and courts have declined to enforceS • 13
promises when there is only nominal consideration. Under the bargain theory
of contracts, promises are enforceable only when they are truly bargained for. 14
The modern consideration doctrine was a product of the economic and
commercial developments in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that
made the enforcement of commercial transactions the essential focus of contract
law. 15 The rise of the mass production manufacturing industries at the end of the
nineteenth century created pressures for uniformity and predictability not only
in the transactions necessary to organize mass production activities, but also in
the transactions necessary for the distribution and marketing of new consumer
products. 16 Commercial pressures manifested themselves both in the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws' attempts to codify
commercial laws, including sales law, 17 and in the American Law Institute's
attempts to bring greater coherence and harmony to private laws through its
restatements, including the Restatement of Contracts. 18 Prominent legal
academics led the quest for unified principles of contract, which was an
important part of the Formalist movement in American law in the early
twentieth century. 19
focus of contracts. Id. at 19. Indeed, this focus served to distinguish contracts as an independent
field of law. Id. at 20.
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) (1981) ("To constitute
consideration, a performance or return promise must be bargained for.").
13. See, e.g., In re Greene, 45 F.2d 428, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (holding that a payment of $1
in return for an executory promise to pay thousands of dollars was only nominal consideration and
therefore did not make the executory promise enforceable).
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. b (1981).
15. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at
112 (1992) (describing the increasing pressure for objective standards in contract law); KREITNER,
supra note 11, at 1-7 (explaining how contract law developed against the backdrop of the
Industrial Revolution).
16. See HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 112; Teeven, supra note 7, at 291-92.
17. See WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR., A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 25-26 (1991).
18. See John P. Frank, The American Law Institute, 1923-1998, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 615,
621 (1998) (providing that the practical needs of "'business, commerce and industry' inspired the
Restatement).
19. Teeven, supra note 7, at 291-94 ("The leadership for [the] doctrinal reexamination of the
doctrine of consideration emanated from legal treatise writers, who were also teachers in the
emerging national law schools.., and would be the drafters of restatements and partial
codifications of contract law.").
[VOL. 60:203
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VALUE OF A PROMISE
There are legitimate debates within the legal academy today about whether
the bargain theory of contracts offers either an adequate positive or normative
theory of contract law.20 Indeed, one esteemed scholar has famously lamented
the "death" of the consideration doctrine21 and argued that it no longer provides
an adequate basis for a positive theory of contract.22 As courts increasingly look
to the doctrines of promissory estoppel and quasi-contract to enforce promises
without consideration and increasingly reject privity defenses, 24 the bargain
theory of contracts seems to offer weaker predictions about when promises will
be enforced and less convincing explanations as to why they should be
enforced.
Other moral arguments can support the bargain theory of contracts, 25 but the
theory has a natural affinity with the consequentialist tradition of moral
reasoning and the law and economics approach to legal analysis. 26 It is not
surprising, therefore, that some scholars have objected to the normative
implications of the bargain theory from nonconsequentialist moral
perspectives. 27 As a general matter, however, the nonconsequentialist moral
arguments usually imply the necessity of enforcing a broader range of promises
than merely those that are bargained for. 28 The debate about the role of the
consideration doctrine in contract law is thus primarily about which promises
should be enforceable and which should not be enforceable. There is a
20. There is no question that the expansion of the doctrines of promissory estoppel and quasi-
contract (or the "material benefit" rule) has eroded the predictive power of the bargain theory. See
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 69-77 (1974). However, the expansion of these
doctrines may not mark such a drastic departure from the bargain theory as one might think.
Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343,
349 (1969). Henderson argues that the manner in which courts have applied the doctrine of
promissory estoppel has simply expanded the scope of the exchange contexts in which courts will
enforce promises rather than taken enforceable promises out of exchange contexts altogether. Id.
21. GILMORE, supra note 20, at 3-4.
22. Id. at 62.
23. Id. at 6344, 73-74.
24. JOHN 0. HONNOLD & CURTIS R. REITZ, SALES TRANSACTIONS: DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 272 (3d ed. 2006).
25. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 164-65 (1993).
26. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 119-26 (7th ed. 2007).
27. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS A PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS 19 (1981) (articulating a moral obligation to keep promises based on principles of
trust and respect); TREBILCOCK, supra note 25, at 166 (articulating the theory that keeping
promises increases social welfare by encouraging beneficial forms of reliance).
28. Some prominent legal scholars, for instance, have argued that a sounder normative basis
for contract law lies in the imperative of respecting the freedom of autonomous individuals to
make promises that bind their future behavior. TREBILCOCK, supra note 25, at 164-65 (citing
FRIED, supra note 27, at 7-8). This approach, which is rooted in the Kantian moral tradition,
presumes that all promises should be legally enforceable, regardless of whether they were
bargained for. Id. at 165.
2008]
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widespread consensus that promises should be legally enforceable if they are
truly bargained for; 29 the controversial question is whether any other promises
should also be legally enforceable.
The development of the consideration doctrine has thus helped to define the
modern field of contracts. As the contours of modern contract law formed
around the idea of bargained for consideration in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, other legal doctrines developed to address the problems
raised by gifts and unilateral promises.30 Contract law simultaneously became
more focused on facilitating commercial transactions and less concerned with
defining the legal obligations of parties in exchange relationships. 31 This is
ironic because one of the striking facts about modern American contract law is
that so many of the promises made in the context of commercial transactions are
not legally enforceable.
III. WARRANTIES AND THE LEMONS PROBLEM
In modern American sales law, controversy about when a seller's promises
should be legally enforceable is rooted in disagreements about the appropriate
interpretation to give to the provisions in section 2-313(1)(a) of the UniformS32
Commercial Code (UCC) governing the creation of express warranties. The
increasing complexity of the media through which parties make promises that
might be construed as creating express warranties exacerbates the difficulty of
interpreting section 2-313. 33 Section 2-313(1)(a) states that a seller creates
express warranties that are legally enforceable only when the seller makes an
"affirmation of fact or promise ... which relates to the goods and becomes part
of the basis of the bargain."' 4 But when does a seller's promise become part of
the basis of the bargain? Does a buyer have to see, read, or hear the promise?
35
What if a seller communicates a promise to a buyer after the parties reach an
29. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 25, at 167.
30. KREITNER, supra note 11, at 43-67.
31. See id. at 3-7.
32. See discussion infra Part IV. All references to the UCC in this Essay are to the pre-2003
version.
33. See Matthew A. Victor, Express Warranties Under the U.C.C.-Reliance Revisited, 25
NEW ENG. L. REV. 477, 477-78 (1990) (arguing that in light of commercial developments and new
fact patterns, the case law construing express warranties under the UCC is developing on a case by
case basis and hence is increasingly incoherent).
34. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (1977) (amended 2003).
35. For instance, what if a seller makes promises about its product in radio or television
advertisements and a buyer purchases the product without ever seeing or hearing the
advertisements? See infra text accompanying notes 82-101.
[VOL. 60:203
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agreement? 36 Can a promise become part of the basis of the bargain if a buyer
knows it is false? 37 And most perplexing of all, what if a buyer does not "know"
that a promise is false with anything approaching epistemic certainty, but
nonetheless has reason to doubt its veracity? In short, what role, if any, should
a buyer's reliance on a seller's promise play in the creation of an express
warranty? Neither the courts nor the commentators have found cogent answers
to these questions.
39
This Essay argues that both economic efficiency and basic principles of
social ethics require courts applying the UCC to enforce a broader range of
promises than most courts currently do. From an economic perspective, the
purpose of a sales warranty is to alleviate the lemons problem.40 The lemons
36. For example, what if an owner's manual or other writing delivered to a buyer after a sale
includes promises not communicated to the buyer during contracting? This question is closely
related to the foregoing question, although it has generated much less controversy because most
observers believe the UCC offers a clear and compelling answer. See infra notes 102-106 and
accompanying text.
37. Suppose, for instance, a seller represents a painting to a buyer as an authentic work of
Francis Bacon, but by virtue of the buyer's expertise, the buyer knows with certainty that it is not
the authentic work of Bacon. See discussion infra Part V.C.
38. Suppose a buyer has made previous purchases from a seller and, on the basis of the
buyer's own experience with the seller's product, the buyer has reasons to doubt the veracity of the
seller's promises. See discussion infra Part V.B.
39. See discussion infra Parts V.A-C.
40. Nobel Prize-winning economist George A. Akerlof developed the idea of the lemons
problem in his seminal article, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 494 (1970). Akerlof's article has spawned a significant body of
literature on the role of warranties as signals of product quality. Some scholars have cited
empirical evidence that extensive warranties do not always signal high quality products. See, e.g.,
Jennifer L. Gerner & W. Keith Bryant, Appliance Warranties as a Market Signal?, 15 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 75, 80-84 (1981) (concluding that warranties across a diverse group of consumer
appliances with differing technologies and failure rates "were remarkably similar"); George L.
Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1326-27 (1981)
(examining the relationship between warranty duration and life expectancy of various mechanical
parts and finding "only a very crude relationship" between a product's life expectancy and its
warranty duration). Others have constructed specific models that suggest warranties may not
always provide signals of high quality goods. See, e.g., Esther Gal-Or, Warranties as a Signal of
Quality, 22 CANADIAN J. ECON. 50, 52-60 (1989) (constructing a theoretical model which shows
that in oligopolistic markets, warranties only serve as signals of quality in special cases); Nancy A.
Lutz, Warranties as Signals Under Consumer Moral Hazard, 20 RAND J. ECON. 239, 240-45
(1989) (creating a theoretical model which shows that warranty and product quality are not
positively correlated). But the most general analyses indicate that where warranties involve
affirmations of fact or promises that consumers can objectively verify or refute, the warranties will
provide reliable information about the quality of goods on the market. See, e.g., Sanford J.
Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure About Product Quality,
24 J.L. & ECON. 461, 470-77 (1981) (arguing that warranties are accurate signals for product
quality when the product quality is easily verifiable); Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions,
Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561, 569-71 (showing that where at
2008] VALUE OF A PROMISE
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problem arises whenever there is asymmetric information between sellers and
buyers.41 In the classic scenario, the price that buyers are willing to pay for a
good depends on its quality, but buyers have less information about the quality
of the good than sellers. Although the seller has superior information, the
seller's information is private and the buyer cannot verify it. 43 Since buyers
cannot distinguish the quality of various sellers' goods, buyers will only pay a
price appropriate for goods of the average quality of all goods of the same type
on the market. 44 An individual seller therefore has no incentive to produce a
good of a quality that is higher than the average quality of all goods of the same
type on the market.45 Thus, low quality sellers force high quality sellers out of
the market46 and buyers end up with no alternative to low quality goods, even if
they are willing to pay a premium for goods of verifiable high quality.
47
An express warranty allows a seller to make binding commitments to the
quality of its product. Under UCC section 2-313(1)(a), a seller can distinguish
its goods from other goods on the market by making promises or affirmations of
fact that create legally binding obligations as to its goods' quality.48 In theory, if
the time of purchase consumers observe the level of producer liability for a product, the level of
producer liability is an effective market signal for the probability the product will fail).
41. See URS BIRCHLER & MONIKA BUTLER, INFORMATION ECONOMICS 277-78 (2007). The
study of asymmetric information is central to the literature on principal-agent problems and an
important part of the field of information economics more generally. See id. at 255-399 for a
recent survey.
42. See Akerlof, supra note 40, at 490.
43. Id. There are two basic kinds of asymmetric information problems: "hidden action"
problems and "hidden information" problems. Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of
the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 540, 552 n.37 (1995). Hidden action problems inhere in situations
where one of the parties to a transaction cannot observe the other's actions. See Yane Svetiev,
Antitrust Governance: The New Wave of Antitrust, 38 LOy. U. CmI. L.J. 593, 642 (2007). Hidden
action problems typically give rise to moral hazard problems. See id. For instance, an insurance
company cannot foresee how an automobile insurance policy will affect the driving behavior of its
insured driver. Will the insured party drive with less care? How much less? Hidden information
problems, on the other hand, inhere in situations where one party to a transaction has information
that is of value to the other party but that is usually strategically withheld. See id.; see also
BIRCHLER & BUTLER, supra note 41, at 277 (explaining hidden information problems in the health
insurance context). The lemons problem is a classic example of the hidden information problem.
See Bengt Holmstr6m, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979), for a classic
treatment of asymmetric information problems.
44. BIRCHLER & BUTLER, supra note 41, at 279-80. Indeed, the buyers will only pay a price
that is appropriate for a product of average quality if they are risk-neutral; if they are risk-averse
they will pay less than that.
45. Id. at 282-83.
46. Id. at 283.
47. Id. In other words, they end up with no alternative but to buy a "lemon."
48. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (1977) (amended 2003) ("Express warranties by the seller are
created as follows: Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates
[VOL. 60:203
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VALUE OF A PROMISE
the seller's promises or affirmations prove to be false, a buyer will have a claim
for damages for a breach of an express warranty. 49 In practice, however,
difficult questions arise when the buyer never saw, read, or heard the promises,
or when the buyer had reason to doubt whether they were true. In those
circumstances, courts have often declined to enforce the seller' s promises on the
grounds that the buyer did not rely on them and that the promises were therefore
not part of the basis of the bargain. 50 While it comports with the idea of
bargained for consideration, in these contexts the reliance requirement has
significantly narrowed the scope of promises that many courts have been
willing to enforce in commercial transactions.
From a policy perspective, this is a regrettable consequence of an unduly
doctrinal approach to contract questions in a world where commercial
transactions clearly no longer fit the neat doctrinal box that classical contract
theorists fashioned for them in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries-if
they ever did. 51 Sellers' promises can and should be much more widely
enforced. In most sales transactions-certainly in those involving a
sophisticated merchant seller of a widely marketed good-there is no morally
defensible reason for allowing the seller to evade responsibility for its
promises.52 Indeed, save for the extremely rare case where a buyer knows with
to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.").
49. Id. § 2-714(2) (allowing recovery of expectation damages for breach of warranty); id. § 2-
715 (allowing recovery of incidental and consequential damages).
50. See discussion infra Part V.A-B.
51. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977) (providing a historical overview of commercial
production and distribution in the United States). By the late nineteenth century, it was already
common for manufacturers to mass produce consumer goods and ship them to distant states. Id. at
207. The manufacturers often sold the goods to retailers who resold them to the consumers. Id.
There was thus no privity of contract between the manufacturers and the consumers who ultimately
bought the goods. The lack of privity barred consumers from bringing express warranty claims
against the manufacturers and still bars warranty claims in some states. See, e.g., Twin Disc, Inc.
v. Big Bud Tractor, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 208, 215 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (citing Barlow v. DeVilbiss Co.,
214 F. Supp. 540, 543 (E.D. Wis. 1963); Paulson v. Olson Implement Co., 319 N.W.2d 855, 859
(Wis. 1982); City of LaCrosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., Inc., 240 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Wis.
1976)) (stating that Wisconsin law requires privity of contract to find liability on breach of express
warranty). Most courts eventually dropped the privity requirement for an express warranty claim.
See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3. They recognized that the requirement of an actual bargain
between manufacturers and consumers was merely a technical impediment to a legitimate contract
claim. Courts' widespread rejection of the privity requirement for express warranty claims reflects
the limitations of any narrow conception of the bargain theory of contracts.
52. This is not to say there is never any morally defensible reason to excuse a seller from its
contractual obligations. The question of whether a court should excuse a seller from performing its
contractual obligations is very different from that of whether a seller's promises create an
obligation in the first place. See generally Donald J. Smythe, Bounded Rationality, the Doctrine of
Impracticability, and the Governance of Relational Contracts, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 227
2008]
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something very close to epistemic certainty that a seller's promise is false and
the seller genuinely does not,53 any diminution of sellers' legal obligations for
promises they make about their goods only inhibits their efforts to surmount the
lemons problem by making legally enforceable promises about their products.
To the extent that courts have invoked the reliance requirement to narrow the
enforceability of merchant sellers' promises, they have undermined the
efficiency of markets by reducing the amount of reliable information available
to buyers.
Because the logic for construing the basis of the bargain test under UCC
section 2-313(1)(a) to include a reliance requirement derives largely from the
premise that promises cannot be bargained for if buyers do not rely upon them,
the doctrine of consideration raises a formal impediment to the enforcement of
many of the promises that merchant sellers make in commercial transactions. If
there was any countervailing rationale for upholding the formalities of the
consideration doctrine in these contexts that might justify sacrificing some of
the economic and other social benefits of enforcing promises more widely.
None of the traditional rationales for having a formal consideration requirement,
however, appear to outweigh the damage it does by undermining the
enforcement of merchant sellers' promises.
Contract scholars struggled with the formality of the consideration doctrine
well into the twentieth century. 54 In an influential article that is still widely
cited, Professor Lon Fuller distinguished between the formal and substantive
functions of the consideration doctrine. 55 He identified the three formal
functions as (1) evidentiary, (2) cautionary, and (3) channeling. 56 The
evidentiary function is obvious: bargained-for consideration provides evidence
of an enforceable agreement. 57 The cautionary function is somewhat less
obvious: requiring consideration in return for a promise ensures the promise is
of value to the promisee because promisees will take care to ensure the
promises owed them are worth the consideration they must offer in return. The
consideration requirement thus serves a cautionary function by helping to
prevent the enforcement of impulsive promises that parties make without
sufficient deliberation. 58 The channeling function is perhaps the least obvious:
(2004) (concluding that the impracticability doctrine can potentially improve efficiency and
productivity in relational contracts).
53. This is clearly not going to happen very often, especially in transactions between
merchant sellers and nonmerchant buyers.
54. See Symposium, On the Complexity of Consideration, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 777 (1941).
55. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941).
56. Id. at 800-01.
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the consideration requirement helps parties channel their agreements into those
that are legally enforceable and those that are not.
59
According to Fuller, legal formalities are necessary when they help to
induce deliberation and when economic activities do not already fit clear-cut
business categories. 60 The kind of promises that manufacturers and retailers
make when they market mass produced goods are not exactly those for which
contract law needs to encourage either deliberation or channeling. Merchant
sellers should and almost invariably do deliberate carefully about the promises
they make in their advertisements and writings, and they clearly understand that
the purpose of placing their goods in the distribution chain ultimately is to make
a sale. Moreover, there is little need for evidence of a bargain in commercial
transactions involving the distribution and marketing of a mass produced good.
To the extent that a formal consideration requirement merely serves the
evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions Fuller identified, it hardly
appears to be necessary in circumstances where a merchant seller makes
promises in the marketing of a mass produced good. To the extent that the
reliance requirement under section 2-313(1)(a) derives from the consideration
doctrine, therefore, the reliance requirement hardly appears to be necessary
either.
Fuller also identified three substantive functions of contract law: (1) to
respect and support parties' private autonomy by enforcing with legal sanctions
61rules they have set for themselves by voluntarily making promises, (2) to
protect parties who rely on promises that are not kept, and (3) to prevent
63
unjust enrichment. None of these functions support restricting the enforcement
of merchant sellers' promises about their products either, regardless of whether
the sellers' promises are bargained for. Clearly, sophisticated sellers who
deliberate carefully and make their decisions intentionally incur moral
obligations whenever they make promises, and not only when they offer
promises in return for consideration. Of course, if a buyer does not provide
consideration in return for a promise, the buyer cannot have actually relied on
the promise. Nonetheless, as Fuller argued, the reliance function of contract
supports the enforcement of a promise whenever there is some likelihood that a
buyer may rely on it and not just when there is actual reliance.64 A merchant
seller who makes a promise in a commercial context clearly understands that
there is some likelihood that the buyer will rely upon the promise. Given the
difficulties of proving actual reliance upon the promise, Fuller argued that strict
59. See id. at 801.
60. See id. at 806.
61. Id. at 806-07.
62. Id. at 810.
63. Id. at 812-13.
64. Id. at 811-12.
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enforcement would serve as "a kind of prophylactic measure against losses
through reliance which will be difficult to prove if they occur.
65
Fuller regarded the unjust enrichment question as an "aggravated case ofS ,66
loss through reliance." But in this regard, it would be best to keep Fuller's
distinction between the likelihood of reliance and actual reliance in mind. A
merchant seller who is not held to strict legal obligations for promises made in
the marketing and distribution of its product almost certainly enriches itself
unjustly at others' expense. Of course, if the buyer in a particular case does not
actually rely on the promise one might argue that no unjust enrichment has
occurred. But this would make application of the unjust enrichment doctrine
subject to all the evidentiary problems that Fuller decried in addressing the
reliance problem generally.
Moreover, as the discussion below elaborates, sophisticated merchant
sellers often attempt to use advertising to influence potential buyers' general
impression of the quality and attributes of the sellers' products. 67 Sellers
typically hope to influence the decisions of a much wider range of potential
buyers than those that actually see, read, or hear their advertisements. Even if a
particular buyer cannot recall a seller's advertisement, there is some likelihood
that the advertisement may influence the buyer's decision to purchase the
product indirectly through the influence of other buyers who did see, read, or
hear the advertisements. If a seller's advertising promises are not enforceable,
therefore, the seller may unjustly enrich itself by making false promises,
regardless of whether a buyer can prove actual reliance.
IV. THE ROOTS OF RELIANCE IN THE BASIS OF THE BARGAIN TEST
Modern warranty law under the UCC has its roots in the tort of fraudulent
misrepresentation. 68 Most courts hold that a fraudulent misrepresentation occurs
when a defendant, with the intent to deceive, knowingly makes a false
representation to the plaintiff that induces the plaintiff to act in reliance and• • 69
causes an injury. Reliance is thus an essential element of the tort. Indeed, prior
to the Uniform Sales Act, warranty claims sounded in tort rather than contract.
70
Thus, when Samuel Williston drafted the Uniform Sales Act, he expressly
65. Id. at 812.
66. Id.
67. See discussion infra Part V.A.
68. DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4:4, at 133 (3d
ed. 2000); see White, supra note 4, at 2090-92.
69. See Decry v. Peek, (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337, 374 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (first
stating the elements of the rule); cf DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 470, at 1345 (2000)
(providing elements of fraudulent misrepresentation).
70. White, supra note 4, at 2090.
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included a reliance requirement in the express warranty provision. 71 Some
scholars believe that Karl Llewellyn attempted to eliminate the vestiges of the
tort underpinnings in express warranty law when he drafted Article 2 of the
UCC and replaced the reliance requirement with a basis of the bargain
requirement. As Llewellyn drafted it, a seller creates an express warranty
under section 2-313(1)(a) by an "affirmation of fact or promise ... which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain .... 73
The problem, of course, was that the reliance requirement had become
deeply rooted in the case law, and lawyers, scholars, and judges had widely
accepted it by the time Llewellyn drafted the UCC.74 Moreover, regardless of
Llewellyn's intent, it is not at all clear from the drafting history of the UCC that
section 2-313 eliminates the reliance requirement. Thus, as James White
quipped, "If Llewellyn did not intend basis of the bargain to be a proxy for a• • ,76
diluted form of reliance, he has fooled many courts." While some courts
interpret the basis of the bargain language in UCC section 2-313 to imply a
reliance requirement of some kind, most courts do not clearly state the precise
71. UNIF. SALES ACT § 12 (1906) ("Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller
relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise
is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying
thereon.").
72. See, e.g., Charles A. Heckman, "Reliance" or "Common Honesty of Speech": The
History and Interpretation of Section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 38 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1, 3, 14 (1987) (stating that Llewellyn's comments to the Uniform Revised Sales Act make
clear that reliance is no longer the "crucial factor" in creating an express warranty); Richard L.
Savage III, Comment, Laying the Ghost of Reliance to Rest in Section 2-313 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: An "Endpoints" Analysis, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1065, 1073-74 (1993)
(suggesting that the purpose of the basis of the bargain requirement in section 37 of the Uniform
Revised Sales Act clearly took a different approach than earlier authorities in dropping the reliance
language) (citing UNIF. REVISED SALES ACT § 37 cmt. 1, at 148-49 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,
1944)). Other scholars are more circumspect. See, e.g., White, supra note 4, at 2095 ("Perhaps
[the comments to UCC section 2-313] are an admission that if [Llewellyn] had his own way and
was free of the restraint of the drafting committee ... he might abandon all the trappings of tort,
and make express warranty simply a matter of contract.") (citing U.C.C. § 2-313 cmts. 3, 7 (1977)
(amended 2003)).
73. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (1977) (amended 2003) (emphasis added).
74. See Heckman, supra note 72, at 3.
75. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 565 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the
New Jersey Study Comments did not mention the change), affd in part, rev'd in panl on other
grounds, 505 U.S. 504, 525-27 (1992). In Cipollone, the seller argued that if the UCC drafters
intended section 2-313 to eliminate the reliance requirement for an express warranty, one might
have expected that they would have noted this change. Id.
76. White, supra note 4, at 2106.
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role reliance plays in the rule.7 7 Most courts cite the official comments when
addressing the matter.78 Official Comment 3 states:
In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the
goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those
goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements need be shown
in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement. Rather, any
fact which is to take such affirmations, once made, out of the
agreement requires clear affirmative proof.
79
Although the wording does not indicate that section 2-313 in any sense requires
reliance, the comment's reference to facts which might take a seller's promises
out of the agreement is sometimes understood to mean facts which refute a
buyer's reliance on such promises. 8
0
V. SHOULD EXPRESS WARRANTIES BE CREATED EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF
RELIANCE?
A number of important cases have rejected express warranty claims on the
grounds that the buyer did not rely on the seller's promises. 81 Although courts
have not widely followed these cases, courts have not widely rejected or
criticized these cases either, and these cases stand as persuasive authorities that
courts in other jurisdictions may follow. Courts have rejected buyers' express
warranty claims in three distinct sets of circumstances: (1) those in which a
seller made promises in advertisements prior to contracting with a buyer, but the
buyer did not read, see, or hear the advertisements; (2) those in which a seller
made promises in a series of repeated transactions with a buyer, and the buyer's
experience with the seller's goods in the earlier transactions should have raised
doubts about the veracity of the seller's promises in the later transactions; and
(3) those in which a seller made promises that a buyer knew to be false at the
time of contracting. Unfortunately, only in the last set of circumstances does the
77. Id. at 2102.
78. Debra L. Goetz et al., Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial
Transactions: An Update, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1174 (1987).
79. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (1977) (amended 2003).
80. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-5, at 352. Section 2-313(1)(a) indicates that either
affirmations of fact or promises may create express warranties. There is a subtle difference
between the two, but for practical purposes an affirmation of fact about the quality of a product is
essentially the same as a promise about the quality of the product. For convenience, the discussion
here will treat affirmations of fact as promises.
81. See discussion infra Part V.A-C.
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rejection of an otherwise valid warranty claim make any sense in terms of either
economic efficiency or social ethics.
A. Promises the Buyer Did Not See, Read, or Hear
Consider the first scenario: In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,82 the Third
Circuit held that the district court erred by not requiring the plaintiff to prove
that his wife, Rose Cipollone, saw, read, or heard the affirmations of fact that
the defendant, Liggett Group, Inc. (Liggett), had made in its advertisements. 
8 3
Mrs. Cipollone had become ill with lung cancer and alleged the cancer resulted
from smoking Liggett' s cigarettes.84 She and her husband asserted a variety of
actions against Liggett.85 She based her express warranty claim on statements
Liggett made in some of its advertisements, such as the statement that Livgett' s
new filter tipped cigarettes were 'just what the doctor ordered." The
Cipollones won a judgment for breach of an express warranty at trial, but
Liggett appealed, arguing in part that the trial judge erred in preventing it from
proving that Mrs. Cipollone was not aware of or did not believe its
advertisements. 87 Liggett further argued that the trial judge erred by not
instructing the jury on the reliance requirement in section 2-313(1)(a).
88
The Third Circuit noted that while some courts have rejected a reliance
requirement for section 2-313(1)(a), a majority has said there is a reliance
requirement of some kind. 89 Moreover, the court noted that some distinguished
commentators have also taken this position.90 The court also pointed out that
although the UCC clearly replaced the Uniform Sales Act's express reliance
requirement with the basis of the bargain language, the New Jersey Study
Comments did not discuss the change.91 Further, the court cited an earlier Third
Circuit case 92 that interpreted section 2-313 to mean that courts were to consider
the reliance requirement under the Uniform Sales Act as a factor in assessing
82. 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd in panl, rev'd in panl on other grounds, 505 U.S. 504,
525-27 (1992).
83. Id. at 569.
84. Id. at 551-52.
85. Id. at 552. By the time the case went to trial, Mrs. Cipollone had died. Id.
86. Id. at 551 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id. at 547.
88. Id. at 555.
89. Id. at 564.
90. Id. (citing WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-5, at 351).
91. Id. at 565.
92. Id. at 566 (citing Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir.
1965), amended by 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966)).
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the basis of the parties' bargain.93 With a show of deference to New Jersey state
law, the Cipollone court stated its opinion:
[W]e believe that the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold that a
plaintiff effectuates the "basis of the bargain" requirement of section 2-
313 by proving that she read, heard, saw or knew of the advertisement
containing the affirmation of fact or promise. Such proof will suffice
"to weave" the affirmation of fact or promise "into the fabric of the
agreement,"... and thus make it a part of the basis of the bargain.
94
Cipollone stands for the proposition that promises or affirmations made by
sellers in advertisements in media such as newspapers, magazines, radio, or
television prior to buyers' purchases do not become part of the basis of the
bargain unless the buyers can prove they actually saw, read, or heard them. If
there is a reliance requirement for the creation of an express warranty, as many
courts believe,95 this is hardly contentious: buyers cannot rely on promises or
affirmations they are unaware of at the time of contracting. The issue, of course,
is whether reliance should be required.
Other courts have followed Cipollone's logic. For example, in Stuto v.
Corning Glass Works,96 the plaintiff made a breach of express warranty claim
based on advertisements in which Corning Glass Works stated its dishes were
unbreakable. 97 The district court held that the plaintiff could not have relied on
advertisements she could not remember. 98 In Dilenno v. Libbey Glass Division,
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 99 the plaintiff made a breach of express warranty claim
based on statements in the Libbey Glass Division, Owens-Illinois, Inc. (Libbey
93. Pritchard, 350 F.2d at 491 n.7 (citing U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (1977) (amended 2003))
("The comment[s] by the drafters ... make it clear that what was formerly described as reliance is
now absorbed as a factor which is made a basis of the bargain.").
94. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 567-68 (citations omitted).
95. See, e.g., Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp. of Santa Barbara, 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1104
n.9 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing Friedman v. Medtronic, Inc., 345 N.Y.S.2d 637, 643 (N.Y. App. Div.
1973)) ("In order to recover for breach of express warranty, a party must normally show that he
relied upon the warranty in making the purchase .... ); Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 358
N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (finding the plaintiffs did not establish an express warranty
absent evidence of reliance); Hillcrest Country Club v. N.D. Judds Co., 461 N.W.2d 55, 61 (Neb.
1990) ("This court has held that '[s]ince an express warranty must have been "made part of the
basis of the bargain," it is essential that the plaintiffs prove reliance upon the warranty."' (quoting
Wendt v. Beardmore Suburban Chevrolet, Inc., 366 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Neb. 1985))).
96. [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 12,585, at 37,578 (D. Mass. July
23, 1990).
97. Id. at 37,579.
98. Id. at 37,582.
99. 668 F. Supp. 373 (D. Del. 1987).
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Glass) catalog promising that its jars would open and close properly. 100 The
court granted Libbey Glass summary judgment because the evidence showed
that the plaintiff had never even seen the catalog. 101 Stuto and Dilenno illustrate
that Cipollone's application of the reliance requirement to precontractual
promises in advertisements was hardly sui generis.
The question of whether courts should enforce promises made in
advertisements a buyer has not seen, read, or heard is, in fact, conceptually
related to questions about whether courts should enforce promises or
affirmations made in writings-consumer brochures, owners' manuals, etc.-
and given to buyers only after the parties have contracted. Buyers cannot rely on
promises that sellers communicate to them only after the buyers have made a
purchase decision any more than buyers can rely on promises in advertisements
that they did not see, read, or hear.
There is an important difference, however, between postcontractual
promises that sellers communicate to a buyer through writings such as product
brochures and owners' manuals and precontractual promises that sellers
communicate to a buyer through advertising media such as newspapers and
television. Although the UCC does not offer any specific authority to enforce
precontractual promises made in advertisements, it offers some authority for the
enforcement of postcontractual promises made in writings delivered to the
buyer with the goods. 102 Thus, some courts will enforce postcontractual., . 103
promises as contractual modifications. Under section 2-209(1), contractual
modifications do not require consideration to be binding. 104 However, the
modifications must be made in good faith. 105 Since courts can regard
100. Id. at 376.
101. Id.
102. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 7 (1977) (amended 2003) (suggesting that postcontractual
promises can be treated as contractual modifications). Comment 7 states, "If language is used after
the closing of the deal..., the warranty becomes a modification, and need not be supported by
consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in order .... Id.
103. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Agway, Inc., 506 F.2d 551, 555 n.6 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding
adequate evidence to present a jury question on a breach of warranty claim because a post-sale
assurance "might constitute an actionable modification of [a] warranty"); Mountaineer Contractors,
Inc. v. Mountain State Mack, Inc., 268 S.E.2d 886, 892 (W. Va. 1980) (finding that oral promises
made after an original contract became "subsequent oral modification[s] of the contract").
104. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1977) (amended 2003) ("An agreement modifying a contract within
this Article needs no consideration to be binding.").
105. See id. § 2-209 cmt. 2 ("[M]odifications made [under section 2-209] must meet the test
of good faith .... ). Comment 2 states that "'good faith' between merchants or as against
merchants includes 'observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade' . . . and may in some situations require an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a
modification." Id. (citing U.C.C. § 2-103 (1977) (amended 2003)). Thus, despite what Official
Comment 7 to section 2-313 says, it is not clear that postcontractual promises in brochures and
owners' manuals are within the kind of modifications contemplated by section 2-209. See White,
supra note 4, at 2109 (arguing that sellers should be liable for postcontractual promises made in
2008] VALUE OF A PROMISE
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postcontractual promises or affirmations in brochures, owners' manuals, and
other similar writings as contractual modifications, there has not been as much
controversy about their enforceability. 106
Nonetheless, because of the similarities between precontractual promises in
advertisements and postcontractual promises in brochures and owners' manuals,
there is some irony in the fact that courts may treat them differently. Under the
court's logic in Cipollone, promises in advertisements are enforceable only if
the buyer saw, read, or heard the promises because only then could the promises
have been part of the basis of the bargain. 107 Because the official comments to
the UCC offer a rationale for enforcing postcontractual promises as unilateral., . 108
contractual modifications, however, these promises may be enforceable even
though buyers could not possibly have seen, read, or heard them prior to
contracting, could not possibly have relied on them, and could not possibly have
made them part of the basis of the bargain.
The fact that the UCC allows unilateral modifications subsequent to the
formation of a sales contract 10 9 does create an important difference between
precontractual and postcontractual promises. But it also raises some difficult
questions. Suppose a buyer saw, read, or heard promises in advertisements that
a seller made after the buyer had purchased a good (perhaps on television or in
the latest issue of a monthly magazine). Would the promises be binding as
unilateral modifications? Suppose the seller placed the advertisements before
the buyer purchased the good, but that the buyer saw, read, or heard them only
after making the purchase (perhaps while perusing some old issues of a monthly
magazine)? Would these precontractual promises unilaterally modify the
contract? The logic of cases such as Cipollone and Stuto clearly suggests the
answers would be an emphatic "No."
110
From a policy perspective, however, there is little, if any, reason to draw
such a sharp distinction between precontractual promises made in
advertisements and postcontractual promises made in writings delivered with
the product. Advertising is costly, and usually only merchant sellers will go to
writing and given to a buyer but disputing whether courts should treat these promises as
contractual modifications under section 2-209).
106. See Joan Vogel, Squeezing Consumers: Lemon Laws, Consumer Warranties and a
Proposal for Reform, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 589, 596-97 (1985) (noting that consumers obviously do
not rely on post-purchase promises or affirmations and suggesting that a reliance requirement
would eliminate express warranty protection "in many consumer purchases"). That is not to say
there is no disagreement. See White, supra note 4, at 2109.
107. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 567-68 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd in panl,
rev'd in panl on other grounds, 505 U.S. 504, 525-27 (1992).
108. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 7 (1977) (amended 2003).
109. Id. § 2-209.
110. See generally White, supra note 4, at 2103-05 (citing 150 cases that examine promises
made at various times in relation to the purchase).
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the expense of making promises in advertisements in electronic or print media.
Any rational seller would carefully weigh the costs of an advertisement against
its expected benefits. The expected benefits typically include not only increased
demand from potential buyers that actually see, read, or hear the advertisement,
but also some increased demand from other potential buyers who may hear
about the promises made in the advertisement indirectly from others.
Indeed, one of the important motives for mass market advertising is to
improve the general reputation of a product, even among potential buyers who. . 111
never actually see, read, or hear the advertisement. Thus, many consumers
might think that Corning warrants its dishware to be unbreakable, even though
the consumers cannot remember any advertisement in which Corning made
such a promise. The expected benefits to a seller from making a promise in an
advertisement are potentially much greater, therefore, than simply the increase
in sales to buyers who actually see the advertisement. Under the logic of cases
such as Cipollone, however, those buyers who purchase the advertised good
without seeing the advertisement will have no legal recourse for enforcing the
seller's promises. The seller, on the other hand, will benefit from making the
promises without having any legal obligation to keep them or bearing any
liabilities for breaking them, at least not to those buyers who purchased the
good without knowledge of the advertised promise.
This may create some perverse incentives, and it may have some
unfortunate consequences. Sellers may, for instance, have an incentive to make
promises in advertisements that buyers will have difficulty recollecting. This
would allow sellers to reap the benefits of their promises while bearing fewer of
the obligations. Of course, it would also undermine the reliability of sellers'
promises generally and make potential buyers more skeptical about relying on
sellers' reputations. This incentive would frustrate the basic purpose of
advertising and compound the lemons problem. Sellers' promises would
provide less reliable information, and buyers would have even more difficulty
distinguishing between the qualities of various products on the market.
It is difficult to see, therefore, how cases such as Cipollone and Stuto,
which construe the reliance requirement to relieve sellers of express warranty
obligations for promises in advertisements a buyer cannot recall, can do much
good. Although such cases may preserve the formality of the bargain test in
sales contracts, they undermine the economic purpose of sellers' promises and
diminish the efficiency of markets rather than improve them. Moreover, they
discourage sellers from adhering to socially responsible business ethics.
111. See BEN MCCONNELL & JACKIE HUBA, CREATING CUSTOMER EVANGELISTS 51-52
(2003) (explaining that memes, basic ideas or units of information that propagate through a
population, can transmit "from person to person like a handshake" and help consumers understand
what a seller is offering).
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One of the bedrock propositions of Kantian moral theory is that people
should never make promises they do not intend to keep. 112 From a Kantian
perspective, therefore, it would be unethical for a seller to make a promise in an
advertisement if the seller did not intend to keep it, regardless of whether
anyone read, saw, or heard the advertisement. By making a promise, a seller
incurs a moral obligation to keep it. Cases that construe the reliance requirement
for an express warranty to allow a seller to avoid any obligations for promises a
buyer did not see, read, or hear not only have adverse economic consequences,
they also discourage sellers from upholding their moral obligations.
Of course, holding a seller to strict legal obligations for all of the promises
made in its advertisements would raise other questions. Once made, would the
seller always be obligated to keep the promise-even many years after the seller
had stopped making it? Should a seller be offered any means of disclaiming
promises made in its ads? These are difficult questions, and any answers are
likely to seem arbitrary. Nonetheless, it does seem possible to offer reasonable
guidelines. In fact, there is an analogy between the kind of legal obligation that
this Essay proposes for a promise in an advertisement and the implied warranty
of merchantability. 113 The bargain theory of contracts does not imply the need
to enforce an implied warranty of merchantability either. Like the kind of legal
obligation this Essay proposes for promises made in advertisements, the implied
warranty of merchantability can only be rationalized on other grounds. In fact,
legal scholars struggled with the appropriate rationale for the implied warranty
of merchantability well into the twentieth century.
One view was that the doctrine of merchantability was implied as a matter
of law.114 From this perspective, merchantability clearly cannot be rationalized
using a bargain approach to contract. In fact, it is better understood as a legal
regulation on parties' transactions. Absent an acceptable waiver, the law implies
a warranty of merchantability. And of course, the law regulates the acceptable
manner in which a seller can waive the warranty.
112. B. Sharon Byrd & Joachim Hruschka, Kant on "Wy Must I Keep My Promise?", 81
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 47, 47 (2006) ("The duty to keep promises is a categorical imperative.").
113. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977) (amended 2003).
114. John Barker Waite, Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making, 34 MICH. L. REV.
494, 498 (1936) ("[I]mplied warranty exists if the court thinks that public policy requires a seller's
liability in the particular case."). Using beans as an example of a good, Waite argued:
[I]t would be the height of unreason to assume that the seller intended, or the buyer could
have thought he intended, to imply anything more than a representation that the beans were to
the best of his knowledge and belief edible. If this matter of the fair and proper inference
from the seller's actions were left to a jury, the writer believes that in nine verdicts out of ten
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Another view was that the doctrine of merchantability was implied in
fact. 115 On that view, there is a warranty of merchantability implicit in every
sales contract, but the parties refrain from stating it in executing their
agreement. llA warranty of merchantability can more easily be rationalized
under this theory using a bargain approach, but the theory does not seem
historically accurate; the roots of modern warranty law lie in tort rather than
contract,117 and courts declined to enforce implied warranties in many pre-UCC
sales cases.
11 8
Ultimately, of course, the theoretical rationale for the implied warranty of
merchantability does not really matter because the drafters of the UCC codified
it in section 2-314. 119 Indeed, according to one scholar, in the end the two
theoretical rationales come to imply the same outcome. 120 If courts initially
apply the warranty under a theory that it is implied in law, parties will come to
expect that merchantability will be implied in their contracts by default. In other
words, parties will believe a merchantability term is a part of their contracts
unless waived. If courts initially apply the warranty under a theory that it is
115. William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV.
117, 123 (1943). Prosser argued:
The warranty has in fact been agreed upon by the parties as an unexpressed term of the
contract of sale .... [T]he court, by interpreting the language used, the conduct of the parties
and the circumstances of the case, finds that it is there. Such a contract term "implied in fact"
differs from an express agreement only in that it is circumstantially proved.
Id. (citing Lombard v. Rahilly, 149 N.W. 950, 950 (Minn. 1914)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 118 ("In its inception, breach of warranty was a tort. The action was ... for breach
of an assumed duty, and the wrong was conceived to be a form of misrepresentation .... )
118. E.g., Fleetwood v. Swift & Co., 108 S.E. 909, 910 (Ga. Ct. App. 1921) (stating there is
no implied warranty where a dealer sells a good in its original package and knows as much about
the good as the buyer); Scruggins v. Jones, 269 S.W. 743, 744 (Ky. 1925) (citing Walden v.
Wheeler, 154 S.W. 1088, 1090 (Ky. 1913); Bigelow v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 85 A. 396, 399 (Me.
1912)) (finding that a retailer is not liable for product defects unless the retailer makes an express
warranty); Bigelow, 85 A. at 399 ("[I]n the absence of an express warranty the defendant is not
liable."); West v. Emanuel, 47 A. 965, 965-66 (Pa. 1901) (holding that a druggist selling medicine
patented and furnished by a compounder cannot be liable for negligence where the medicine is
defective). See generally Robert C. Brown, The Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective Food
Products, 23 MINN. L. REV. 585 (1939) (discussing whether courts should impose an implied
warranty of merchantability for food products).
119. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1977) (amended 2003).
120. Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Merchant of Section 2-314: Who Needs Him?, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 747, 778 n.145 (1983). Hillinger argued that the distinction between the two
theories of merchantability may be artificial and misleading:
The buyer's actual reasonable expectations may be identical to the common expectations
aroused by such a sale. 'Implied warranties reflect society's judgments about the basic
understandings of the foundation of most deals ..... [and] ... [t]hese societal judgments arise
from common understandings, i.e., the buyer's actual and reasonable understanding in the
transaction.
Id. (citing DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, WARRANTIES AND THE PRACTITIONER 21 (1981)).
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implicitly a part of parties' bargains, the courts have thus made it a part of
parties' contracts as a matter of law. Once a jurisdiction adopts the rule, as in
section 2-314, the initial rationale for its adoption becomes irrelevant.
Nonetheless, if courts hold sellers to strict legal obligations for the promises
they make in their advertisements, the analogy with the implied warranty of
merchantability bears consideration. We could consider the sellers' promises to
be implied in the contract as a matter of fact or a matter of law. Thus, the facts
of a sales contract could imply that the promises sellers make in their
advertisements will become part of the sales contracts regardless of whether
buyers see, read, or hear them. Alternatively, sellers' obligations for their
promises could be implied as a matter of law-the enforcement of such
promises could be construed as a legal regulation on all sales contracts. Of
course, once a jurisdiction adopts the new rule, the theoretical rationale would
matter less than the legal reality. The point is that sellers' obligations for their
promises do not have to be rationalized using the doctrine of consideration and
the bargain theory of contracts. The implied warranty of merchantability
provides an example of another kind of contractual obligation that does not
neatly fit the consideration doctrine or the bargain theory of contracts.
Of course, sellers can disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability.121
To the extent that the analogy with the implied warranty of merchantability is
useful, therefore, a seller should also be able to disclaim any promises it makes
in its advertisements. Of course, section 2-316(2) regulates a seller's attempts to
disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability, 122 and it only seems
reasonable that similar regulations should be placed on a seller's attempts to
disclaim any promises it has made in its advertisements. At the very least, such
disclaimers should be conspicuous and clearly state which promises the seller
disclaims.
It would seem unreasonably burdensome, however, to require a seller to
disclaim promises made in its advertisements many years after it had stopped
making them. Some kind of limit should be placed, therefore, on the life of a
seller's promise. A bright line rule would probably be best. For instance, the
rule could require a seller to disclaim promises made in advertisements for one
year, or three years, or even five years after the seller has stopped making them.
Alternatively, perhaps the rule could require a seller to continue disclaiming the
promises made in advertisements for as long as the seller had made the
promises. For example, if the seller ran the advertisements for three years, then
the seller should make the disclaimers for three years after ending the
advertisements.
121. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1977) (amended 2003).
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B. Promises the Buyer Should Not Have Believed
Consider another scenario: In Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. Lorraine
Corp.,123 the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant, Royal Business Machines,
Inc. (Royal), would not be liable for promises or affirmations it made to the
plaintiff, Booher, if the plaintiff should have known the promises were false
through its prior experience with the product. 124 Royal had sold a number of
photocopiers to Booher in a series of separate transactions over a period of well125
over a year. Royal made several promises about its copiers in each of the
transactions. Some of these promises amounted to no more than sales puffery
or otherwise failed to meet the test in section 2-313(1)(a) for an express
warranty, 127 but others did meet the test for an express warranty, at least in the.... 128
initial transactions. Booher sought damages for Royal's breach of its• • , • 129
promises in all of the parties' transactions. The problem, however, was that
Booher had acquired considerable experience with the copiers over the course
of his dealings with Royal. 13 In the Seventh Circuit's view, Booher may have
had sufficient experience with the copiers to make Booher doubt whether
Royal's promises were true, and in that case Booher could not have relied on
them. 131 If so, this would have taken the promises out of the basis of the bargain
under section 2-313.132
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in a similar
case, Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp.133 On essentially the
same fact pattern-indeed, involving the same type of photocopiers as in Royal
Business Machines-the Eleventh Circuit noted that "[t]he buyer's knowledge
or absence of reliance [would] negate the existence of an express warranty," but
stated that the buyer had established its initial reliance on the seller's promises
by proving it lacked any prior experience with the copiers. 134 In a footnote,
however, the Eleventh Circuit cited Royal Business Machines and concurred in
the view that any experience the buyer acquired with the copiers through its
123. 633 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1980).
124. Id. at 44-45 ("[T]he district court should determine at what stage Booher's own
knowledge and experience prevented him from blindly relying on the representations of Royal.").
125. Id. at 40.
126. Id. at 41.
127. Id. at 41-43.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 40.
130. Id. at 44.
131. Id.
132. Id. ("The same representations that could have constituted an express warranty early in
the series of transactions might not have qualified as an express warranty in a later transaction if
the buyer had acquired independent knowledge as to the fact asserted.").
133. 719 F.2d 1092 (llth Cir. 1983).
134. Id. at 1101.
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dealings with the seller could negate the existence of an express warranty in
subsequent transactions.135
Other cases have followed the same logic, but no case is more striking
than Stuto v. Corning Glass Works. 13 7 In Stuto, the plaintiff was injured when
some dishware manufactured by Corning Glass Works (Corning) broke and cut
her hand. 138 Corning had stated that the dishware was unbreakable in some of its. 139 , . 140
advertisements. Stuto could not remember ever seeing the advertisements.
The court followed logic similar to Cipollone,141 which by itself would have
been enough to take the statements out of the basis of the bargain and defeat her
express warranty claim. 142 But the court went even further and stated that
Stuto's knowledge that Corning's affirmations that its dishware was
unbreakable were false also negated the creation of an express warranty.143
Apparently, Stuto knew that two other dishes from the same set had broken
prior to the incident that caused her injury. 144 This, in the court's view, would
have been sufficient to negate any express warranty that the dishes were, . 145
unbreakable even if Stuto could have remembered seeing the advertisements.
What is most remarkable about the case is not only that the dishes had been a
gift to Stuto, 146 but also that Stuto had no prior dealings with Corning of any
kind. 147 Any doubts she may have had about the truthfulness of Corning's
135. Id. at 1101 n.4 (citing Royal Bus. Machs., 633 F.2d at 44) ("[W]ith each purchase, [the
buyer] acquired expanded knowledge of the capacities of [the copiers]. This expanded knowledge
should be considered in deciding whether the representations formed the basis of the bargain.").
136. See, e.g., Overstreet v. Norden Labs., Inc., 669 F.2d 1286, 1291 (6th Cir. 1982) (citing
Royal Bus. Machs., 633 F.2d at 44; Janssen v. Hook, 272 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971)) ("A
buyer does not disregard any special knowledge he possesses or his accumulated experience with a
product in determining whether to enter the bargain."); Cambridge Eng'g, Inc. v. Robertshaw
Controls Co., 966 F. Supp. 1509, 1524 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (citing Royal Bus. Machs., 633 F.2d at 44)
(holding that affirmations were no longer part of the bargain once the buyer continued to make
purchases after learning of the good's defect).
137. [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 12,585, at 37,578 (D. Mass.
July 23, 1990).
138. Id. at 37,579.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 37,580.
141. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd in panl, rev'd in panl
on other grounds, 505 U.S. 504, 525-27 (1992).
142. Stuto, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) at 37,582.
143. Id. at 37,583.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 37,580. Thus, a lack of privity did not bar Stuto's express warranty claim. Why
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statements could only have come from her experience with the one set of dishes
that she received as a gift.
Stuto stretches the logic of Royal Business Machines and Royal Typewriter
well beyond the breaking point. But the Seventh Circuit's and Eleventh
Circuit's logic in those cases does not stand up to rigorous scrutiny anyway. The
cases essentially raise a question about which party in a sales contract should
bear the liabilities for a dubious promise-the seller who makes the promise or
the buyer who may have had reason to doubt the veracity of the promise by
virtue of the buyer's course of dealings with the seller. From an economic
perspective, the party that is best situated to avoid the liabilities should bear
them. 148 In general, this is the seller. It is the seller who makes the promise; the
seller can avoid creating any potential liabilities for making false promises
simply by not making them. Of course, the buyer can avoid bearing any costs
from the seller's false promises simply by not relying on the promises, so the
real issue is whether the buyer or the seller is in a better position to evaluate the
veracity of the seller's promises. Where the seller is a merchant, the
presumption must be that the seller knows more about the veracity of its
promises than the buyer, even if the buyer has had prior experience with the
seller's product. Where the seller is a nonmerchant, the buyer is highly unlikely
to be a repeat customer and so the issue would be largely moot.
Most large scale manufacturers take measures to assess and control the
quality of the goods produced in their manufacturing processes.149 Because a
manufacturer is able to sample from the entire universe of the goods it produces,
it is in the best position to determine what kinds of promises about its products
will be reliable. Some of the manufacturer's goods will almost inevitably fail to
live up to the promises. But the manufacturer is in the best position to decide
whether the benefits of making the promises exceed the costs associated with
any liabilities if and when the promises turn out to be false. Normally, any
buyer of the goods will only be able to draw inferences about the veracity of the
manufacturer's promises from a small and possibly biased sample of the
manufacturer's total production-the goods actually delivered to the buyer. The
manufacturer, on the other hand, is able to draw inferences from a much larger
and unbiased sample of the goods-a sample that is possibly as large as the
entire universe of the goods the manufacturer produces. Thus, it is the
manufacturer' s inferences that should be more reliable.
Of course, the manufacturer may distribute its goods through an
intermediary. In this situation the manufacturer will not be the buyer's seller.
148. See POSNER, supra note 26, at 98 (asserting that the "right economic result" is for the
best cost avoider to bear the liabilities).
149. See generally DOUGLAS C. MONTGOMERY, INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL QUALITY
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Most jurisdictions now allow buyers to make express warranty claims against
remote manufacturers, 15 so this does not limit the moral force of the argument
that manufacturers should be liable to the ultimate purchasers of their goods for
any of the promises they make about their goods. It does, however, raise
questions about the responsibilities of the intermediaries in the distribution
chain. In some cases, retailers of the manufacturer's goods may have little more
information about the goods than the ultimate buyers. Retailers may nonetheless• • 151
make various promises about the goods in order to enhance their sales. To the
extent that they do so, they should bear the same legal obligations for those
promises as any manufacturer that makes such promises. 152 Retailers are much
better situated to acquire information about the manufacturers' goods they sell
than are their customers. Retailers can protect themselves contractually from
their reliance on any misinformation about the goods provided to them by the
manufacturers. Even though they might not have as much information about the
goods as the manufacturers, retailers will typically have far more information
than any of their own customers. 153
This approach is consistent with the one taken by the Second Circuit in
Rogath v. Siebenmann.154 In that case the buyer, Rogath, purchased a painting
from Siebenmann. 155 In the bill of sale, Siebenmann vouched that the painting
was by Francis Bacon and that he was unaware of any challenges to the
authenticity of the painting. 156 After Rogath sold the painting to another party,
however, the other party learned of a challenge to the painting's authenticity
and requested that the transaction be rescinded. 157 Rogath agreed, but
subsequently sued Siebenmann for breach of an express warranty.
The trial court found that Siebenmann knew there had been a challenge to
the authenticity of the painting when he sold it to Rogath and awarded Rogath
significant damages.159 On appeal to the Second Circuit, Siebenmann conceded
150. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3.
151. Retailers' profits depend heavily on their markups and their sales rates. The faster they
can turn over their inventories, the better.
152. The UCC clearly holds retailers liable for any express warranties they create through an
"affirmation of fact or promise which.., relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the
bargain." U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (1977) (amended 2003).
153. A retailer will generally sell goods to many customers. As a result, it will likely receive
many complaints and warranty claims that provide information about the veracity of promises
made in the marketing of a good. The retailer can thus draw inferences about the promises from a
much wider sample than the one available to any individual buyer.
154. 129 F.3d261 (2d Cir. 1997).
155. Id. at 262-63.
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that he had made promises and representations about the authenticity of the
painting but argued that Rogath was fully aware of the challenges to the
painting's authenticity at the time of sale, and therefore Rogath could not haveS• 160,16
relied on the promises. The court found some truth to Siebenmann' s claim. 161
The question, therefore, was whether Rogath's doubts about Siebenmann's
promises defeated his express warranty claim. The Second Circuit noted that,
while this had been an unsettled question in the state of New York,162 the New
York Court of Appeals had rejected the tort theory of express warranties in163
favor of a contract based theory in a non-UCC case. From this perspective,
the question was not "whether the buyer believed in the truth of the warranted
information.., but whether [he] believed [he] was purchasing the [seller's]
promise [as to its truth]."
' 164
The Rogath approach treats an express warranty as if it were an insurance
policy on the veracity of the seller's promise. As the Second Circuit has noted,
however, a seller may attempt to disclaim its promise in writing at the time of
sale.165 In Galli v. Metz, the court reasoned that
Where a buyer closes on a contract in the full knowledge and
acceptance of facts disclosed by the seller which would constitute a
breach of warranty under the terms of the contract, the buyer should be
foreclosed from later asserting the breach. In that situation, unless the
buyer expressly preserves his rights under the warranties .... we think
the buyer has waived the breach. 166
Following Galli, a buyer could only preserve his rights in the face of a seller's
attempts to disclaim its promises by expressly stating that any disputes
regarding the accuracy of the seller's warranties are unresolved and that the




161. Id. at 265-66.
162. Id. at 263.
163. Id. at 264 (citing CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ'g Co., 553 N.E.2d 997, 1001 (N.Y.
1990)).
164. Id. (quoting CBS, 553 N.E.2d at 1000-01) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
165. Galli v. Metz, 973 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 1992).
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Although the Second Circuit did not mention it, the seller in Rogath was a
merchant, so it is unclear whether the court meant to extend its holding to
cases involving nonmerchant sellers. Nonetheless, it is clear that Rogath would
hold merchant sellers to strict contractual obligations for their promises unless
they explicitly disclaimed the promises during execution of a contract. In this
regard, the Second Circuit's approach to dealing with the problem that arises
when a buyer has reason to doubt a seller's promise is completely analogous to
the approach recommended in the preceding section of this Essay for dealing
with sellers' promises in advertisements. Thus, Rogath not only offers a
compelling answer to the question of what to do when a buyer has reasonable
doubts about a seller's promise, but its logic is also compatible with a much
more general and yet simple rule: courts should hold sellers to strict contractual
obligations for all their promises regardless of whether they are made in
precontractual advertisements or in postcontractual brochures and manuals;
regardless of whether the buyer reads, sees, or hears them; and even if the buyer
has serious reasons to doubt whether they are true. 169
C. Promises the Buyer Knew Were False
Cases such as Royal Business Machines17 and Stuto 171 in which a buyer
acquires some knowledge of a merchant seller's product through personal
experience should be distinguished from cases in which a defendant seller may
allege that a buyer knows its promises are false for other reasons-most likely
because of the buyer's expertise in merchandise of the kind being sold, but172
perhaps also by happenstance. They should also be distinguished from cases
168. While the court did not explicitly state that the seller was a merchant, the discussion of
the seller's extensive interactions with other art dealers suggests this was the case. See Rogath, 129
F.3d at 265.
169. Cf Robert S. Adler, The Last Best Argument for Eliminating Reliance from Express
Warranties: "Real-World" Consumers Don't Read Warranties, 45 S.C. L. REV. 429, 472 (1994)
("The fairest test is a simple one: Buyers who can demonstrate that they fit into the class of persons
to whom an affirmation of fact or promise has been targeted should be permitted to claim the
benefits of the affirmations or promises under section 2-313's 'part of the basis of the bargain'
language. Only if the seller can demonstrate that the buyer was not affected by such
representations or that the buyer's purchase price did not in any way rest upon the representations
should the seller escape warranty liability.").
170. Royal Bus. Machs. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1980).
171. Stuto v. Coming Glass Works, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
12,585, at 37,578 (D. Mass. July 23, 1990).
172. Indeed, these will be analogous to cases in which a seller makes a unilateral mistake and
a buyer knows the seller is making a unilateral mistake. Such cases will be rare. Cases in which a
seller makes a unilateral mistake about the price of a good are more common. See, e.g., Aviation
Sales, Inc. v. Select Mobile Homes, 548 N.E.2d 307, 311 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that for
a seller to succeed with a claim that it made a unilateral mistake in pricing, it must prove the buyer
[VOL. 60:203
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in which the seller knowingly makes false promises with the intent to deceive
the buyer, since in these cases the law of fraudulent misrepresentation would
clearly apply.173 Indeed, they are essentially cases in which a seller makes a
unilateral mistake. There are four possible situations in which a seller might
make promises in good faith that a buyer knows to be false: (1) the seller is a
nonmerchant and the buyer is a merchant, (2) both the seller and buyer are
nonmerchants, (3) the seller is a merchant and the buyer is a nonmerchant, and
(4) both the seller and buyer are merchants.
Although there is a strong argument for holding sellers to strict legal
obligations for their promises in cases such as Royal Business Machines and
Stuto, where a buyer may doubt whether a seller' s promises are true by virtue of
personal experience with the good, the question here is quite different. Here the
question is not whether courts should hold the seller to strict legal obligations
for promises the buyer has reason to doubt. The question is whether courts
should hold the seller to strict legal obliations for promises that the buyer
knows to be false with epistemic certainty.
For example, suppose a seller asserts to a buyer that a watch is a Rolex, but
the buyer is absolutely certain that it is in fact a much less expensive Swatch
watch; or suppose a seller asserts to a buyer that a vase is an antique from the
Ming Dynasty, but the buyer is absolutely certain that it is merely a cheap
imitation of a Ming Dynasty vase. These scenarios raise unique ethical issues. If
the law holds sellers to strict legal obligations for all promises, then a seller
would be liable for a breach of an express warranty created by a promise that a
buyer knew with absolute certainty to be false at the time of contracting. The
buyer could purchase the goods with the intention of making a breach of
express warranty claim. In fact, a perfectly rational, utility maximizing buyer
not otherwise constrained by a moral conscience would sue unless the expected
legal costs of the lawsuit exceeded the expected damages. Holding the seller to
strict legal obligations in these circumstances would thus allow the buyer to
unjustly enrich itself at the seller' s expense. It would appear not merely to allow
the buyer to take advantage of the seller's false promise, but to encourage the
buyer to do so. If the seller has indeed made the promise without realizing it
was false, such a rule would hardly encourage desirable social ethics.
recognized and appreciated the seller's miscalculation); Gen. Elec. Supply Corp. v. Republic
Constr. Corp., 272 P.2d 201, 202-3 (Or. 1954) (refusing to rescind a contract because the buyer
did not know and could not have reasonably known the seller made a mistake in quoting the price).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
174. It is difficult to define epistemic certainty. The basic idea is that it is a certain belief. The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines epistemic certainty simply as a belief that "has the
highest possible epistemic status." Baron Reed, Certainty, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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Moreover, holding sellers to strict legal obligations for false promises might
also have economically undesirable consequences. In particular, it might
discourage buyers from informing sellers about the falsity of the sellers'175
promises. The market would then lose a mechanism for correcting the spread
of misinformation-any reasonable seller would cease to make false promises
to other buyers as soon as the seller became aware they were false. 176 In this
respect, when a buyer knows with something close to epistemic certainty that a
seller' s promises are false, denying the buyer damages for breach of an express
warranty may have a socially beneficial external effect on transactions between
the seller and other buyers.
Indeed, a rule favoring the mistaken seller might serve as an information
forcing device similar to the kind Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner suggested for
some contract default rules more generally. 177 In the face of a seller's false
promise, the rule would encourage a buyer to reveal private information about
the falsity of the seller's promises as part of the negotiation process. If the buyer
wanted to convince the seller to lower the price, the buyer could do so by
pointing out that the seller's promise has no value because it is not only false
but will not create a legally enforceable warranty. This would at least apprise
the seller of the error. The social benefits of bringing the error to the seller's
attention would accrue from forestalling the seller from making the same false
promise to other buyers. Although the buyer would derive no benefit
individually, other buyers would benefit from an improvement in the accuracy
and reliability of the seller's promises.
One could draw on the Coase Theorem to argue that it would not really
matter whether the rule assigned the liabilities for the false promise to the buyer
or the seller. The Coase Theorem suggests that the parties could always contract
around the rule to internalize any positive externalities through a market
transaction. 178 Of course, this solution to the problem would require sellers to
175. A buyer might rely on the legal enforceability of a false promise as a means of
extracting damages from a seller after the sale. If the buyer could not legally enforce the promises,
this would not be an option, and the buyer would have a clear incentive to inform the seller about
the falsity of the promise as a strategy for bargaining down the price of sale.
176. Any rational seller would certainly want to avoid creating obligations and bearing
liabilities for making false promises to other buyers.
177. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 94 (1989) ("[E]fficiency-minded lawmakers should
sometimes choose penalty defaults that induce knowledgeable parties to reveal information by
contracting around the default penalty.").
178. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 89 (5th ed. 2008) ("When
transaction costs are zero, an efficient use of resources results from private bargaining, regardless
of the legal assignment of ... rights."). The logic is that regardless of how the parties assign legal
rights they will bargain after the fact so that the party who most values the legal rights will hold
them in the end. Id. at 88. Ironically, this was not what Coase meant to imply. Coase was more
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reward buyers for informing them when their promises are false. It seems
unlikely that this would happen. It is doubtful whether many sellers would
announce a policy of rewarding buyers for providing that kind of information in
advance of contracting, and the transaction costs of negotiating a reward after a
buyer discovers the falsity of a seller's promise would probably be
prohibitive. 179 Given the high transaction costs, it would probably be better not
to hold a seller to strict legal obligations for promises that a buyer happens to
know are false if the objective is to rely on market transactions to prevent the
seller from making the same false promise to other buyers.
180
There is an additional economic consideration, however, that may in some
contexts argue for holding a seller liable for false promises even when a buyer
knows they are false. One important objective of such a rule might be to reward
parties for their investments of time, effort, and finances.18 1 As a general matter,
this will encourage not only the development of new production facilities and
other physical infrastructure,182 but also the creation of new knowledge.18 3 Of
course, intellectual property laws allow parties to exercise property rights in
their inventions, creations, and expressions, 184 but they do not generally reward
the parties for their knowledge and expertise unless it is covered by a patent or
185copyright As Anthony Kronman has suggested, one way of rewarding a
buyer for the knowledge or expertise that allows the buyer to know a seller's
promise is false is to allow the buyer to exercise a right in the information. 186 In
concerned with understanding how positive transaction costs would affect the allocation of
resources given the assignment of legal rights. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
&ECON. 1, 19 (1960).
179. The Coase Theorem assumes zero transaction costs. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 178,
at 89. As Robert Cooter has argued, this requires that the parties to a transaction be able to
negotiate an agreeable division of the surplus from their transaction with no bargaining costs. See
Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17. In this respect, it is unrealistically
optimistic about the potential for private cooperation through market transactions. See id. at 14-20.
180. Coase himself would probably concur. See Coase, supra note 178, at 19 (explaining that
high transaction costs create a challenge in modifying the arrangement of the parties' established
legal rights).
181. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts,
7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15-16 (1978).
182. See id. at 11-12.
183. Id. at 16.
184. See id. at 15.
185. See Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1930) One of the basic
rules of property law is that a party cannot claim property rights in an idea or knowledge unless the
idea or knowledge is covered by a patent or copyright. Id. ("In the absence of some recognized
right at common law, or under the statutes ... a man's property is limited to the chattels which
embody his invention. Others may imitate these at their pleasure.") (citations omitted).
186. Kronman, supra note 181, at 14-15 ("One effective way of insuring that an individual
will benefit from the possession of information ... is to assign him a property right in the
information itself .... Imposing a duty to disclose upon the knowledgeable party deprives him of a
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this context, that would mean holding the seller to a strict legal obligation and
allowing the buyer to make a breach of express warranty claim
Kronman's analysis, however, was directed at the duty to disclose more
generally. 187 It was not directed at the specific type of problem under
contemplation here-one that arguably has unique moral nuances. In particular,
Kronman did not contemplate the kind of positive economic externality which
may figure prominently in cases where a buyer may be able to forestall a seller
from making false promises to other buyers. Moreover, as Kronman suggested,
the argument for not requiring disclosure is strongest when the party with the
information (here, the buyer) acquired it by dint of deliberate and costly efforts;
the argument is weakest when the party (the buyer) acquired it casually or by
happenstance. 188 Thus, he suggests that economic considerations may
strengthen the argument for imposing a duty to disclose on a case-by-case
basis.
189
This would accord with a situational approach to the problem. In some
important ways, moral judgments are often situational, that is, deeply imbedded
in the unique circumstances in which ethical deliberations must be made.190 The
most important situational factors in the particular disclosure problem here are
whether the seller and buyer are merchants or nonmerchants. Thus, the
important situations in which the problem may arise are the four situations
identified at the outset of this section.191 There are four main considerations to
be weighed in each of the four possible situations: (1) the seller's moral
obligation to honor its promises, (2) the buyer's moral obligation not to take
advantage of the seller's vulnerability, (3) the economic benefit of preventing
the seller from making the false promise to other buyers, and (4) the economic
benefit of encouraging parties to invest in acquiring expertise and knowledge.
private advantage which the information would otherwise afford. A duty to disclose is tantamount
to a requirement that the benefit of the information be publicly shared and is thus antithetical to the
notion of a property right which-whatever else it may entail-always requires the legal protection
of private appropriation.").
187. See id. at 2 ("The aim of this paper is to provide a theory which will explain why some
contract cases impose such a duty [to disclose] and others do not.").
188. Id. at 15-16.
189. Id. at 16. He points out, however, that the difficult factual issues may make a case-by-
case approach expensive and impractical. Id. at 17.
190. See JOSEPH FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS: THE NEW MORALITY 26-29 (1966)
(arguing that virtually all moral judgments are situational and that ethical behavior is always
defined relative to its context). For instance, a sale by a merchant seller to a nonmerchant buyer
occurs in a very different moral context than a sale by a nonmerchant seller to a merchant buyer.
The asymmetry in the parties' sophistication is reversed; to the extent that people generally have a
duty not to take advantage of others' vulnerabilities, a merchant seller has a higher moral
obligation to a nonmerchant buyer than a nonmerchant seller has to a merchant buyer.
191. See supra p. 231.
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VALUE OF A PROMISE
As a general matter, sellers always have moral obligations to honor their
promises, so if the law allows a seller to avoid any liabilities for false
promises, it might appear to undermine responsible business ethics. The first
consideration argues for holding the seller liable in all four situations. 193 Most
people would probably consider a buyer opportunistic if the buyer sued a seller
for a false promise that the buyer knew to be false at the time of contracting.
The second consideration argues for relieving sellers of their obligations in all
four situations. 
194
The third consideration-the social benefit of preventing the seller from
making the same false promise to other buyers-argues against holding the
seller to strict legal obligations in all four situations, although the argument may
actually be the strongest when the seller is a merchant. Since a merchant seller
is in the business of selling goods of the kind in question, whereas a
nonmerchant seller is more likely only making a one time sale, a merchant seller
is much more likely to make the false promise to other buyers.
The fourth consideration-the social benefit of rewarding buyers for their
knowledge-also argues in favor of holding the seller liable in all four
situations, although in this case the argument may be strongest when the buyer
is a merchant rather than a nonmerchant. A merchant buyer is more likely to
have acquired the knowledge by virtue of an investment of time and effort,
whereas a nonmerchant buyer is more likely to have acquired the information
by happenstance.
The situational considerations are thus quite nuanced. Indeed, a case-by-
case approach might well result in an incoherent and unpredictable body of
precedents when what is needed is a simple, bright line rule. The rule that
makes the most sense is one that draws on the analogy with a unilateral mistake:
courts should not hold a seller to any legal obligations for making a promise that
a buyer knows to be false. 195 While this might diminish the economic incentives
for parties to invest in acquiring information and allow sellers to evade their
moral obligations, it would also encourage buyers to inform sellers about the
192. See supra text accompanying note 112.
193. Of course, one might argue that merchant sellers generally have a stronger moral
obligation to honor promises than nonmerchant sellers. Thus, the strength of the argument may
depend on the circumstances.
194. As with the first consideration, the strength of the argument may again depend on the
circumstances. A merchant buyer may have a stronger moral obligation not to exploit the
vulnerabilities of a nonmerchant seller than a nonmerchant buyer has toward a merchant seller.
195. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981) ("Where a mistake of one
party at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which he made the contract has a
material effect on the agreed exchange of performances that is adverse to him, the contract is
voidable by him if he does not bear the risk of the mistake under the rule stated in § 154, and (a)
the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable, or (b)
the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake.").
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falsity of their promises and thus help forestall the sellers from making the same
false promises to other buyers. Moreover, it would discourage buyers from
behaving opportunistically by taking advantage of sellers' vulnerabilities.
VI. CONCLUSION
Both economic and moral considerations weigh in favor of holding sellers
to stricter legal obligations for their promises than some courts currently hold
them in applying the basis of the bargain test under section 2-313(1)(a). As a
general matter, courts should hold sellers to strict legal obligations for any
affirmations of fact or promises that they make about their goods unless they
specifically and conspicuously disclaim such promises at the time of
contracting. Courts should hold sellers to strict legal obligations for their
promises regardless of whether their buyers had or should have had any reason
to doubt their promises by virtue of any prior experience with the sellers' goods,
unless the sellers specifically and conspicuously disclaim the promises at the
time of contracting. The only situation in which a seller should be able to avoid
strict legal obligations for its promises is the one the law of unilateral mistake
contemplates: where the seller honestly states an affirmation of fact or promise
that a buyer knows with something very close to epistemic certainty to be false.
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